The Impact of Financial Liberalisation Policies on Financial Development Evidence from Developing Economies by Philip Arestis et al.
THE  I M PACT  OF  FI NANCI AL  LI BERALI SATI ON  POLI CI ES  ON 
FI NANCI AL  DEVELOPM ENT:   EVI DENCE  FROM   DEVELOPI NG 
ECONOMI ES
Phi l i p  A resti s
*     Pani cos  De me t riades       B assam  Fat t ouh K ostas Mo u r a t i di s
Sout h  Bank     Un i versit y  of    Lei cester        Ce Fi MS ,   SOAS So u t h  Bank  Un i versit y
Un i versit y  London                                                                                                                     London
Abs t ract
We   coll ect  dat a on a num ber  of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s,  i ncl udi ng r estr i cti ons on deposi t  
and l endi ng i nt erest  r ates and r eserve and l i qui di t y r equi r em ents,  f r om  centr al  banks 
of six devel opi ng count r i es. We  e s t i ma t e the eff ects of these pol i cies on fi nanci al 
devel opm ent ,   cont r ol l i ng  f or  t he  eff ect  of  econom i c devel opm ent   and  usi ng  standard 
econom et r i c techni ques.  We  f i nd t hat  t he eff ects of f i nanci al pol i cies vary
consi derably  across our  sam ple of  count r i es.    Ou r   f i ndi ngs  dem onst r ate t hat   f i nanci al 
l i berali sati on i s a m uch m ore com plex process than has been assum ed by earl i er 
l i t erature and  i t s eff ects on  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   are am biguous.
J ANUARY  2002 
KEY  W ORDS:   Fi nanci al   D evelopm ent ,   Fi nanci al   Li beral i sati on,   Coi nt egrati on 
Anal ysis.
JEL  CLASSI FI CATI ON:   E5,   N2
* Cor r espondi ng aut hor:  The Bus i ness School ,  Sout h Bank U ni ver sit y London,  103 Borough Road,  
London  SE1  OAA,   UK.   E-m ai l :   p. aresti s@ sbu.ac.uk.1
1.   Introduct i on
*
Ma x   Fr y  wa s   an excell ent  coll eague  and  a very  good  f r i end,   alwa y s   t here t o  hel p  and 
di scuss wo r k.   But   one aspect  Ma x   wa s   part i cularl y hel pful   on i s t he paper  prepared 
f or t hi s occasion.  H e suggest ed to us t hat  i t  w oul d be very fr ui t f ul  t o col l ect 
ourselves dat a on fi nanci al restr aint s, especiall y on devel opi ng count r i es, and t hen 
study t hei r   i m pact  and eff ecti veness.   Ma x ,   of  course,  wr ot e a great  deal  on f i nanci al 
l i berali sati on,  a proponent  of the i deas support i ng t he t hesi s. Ho we v e r ,  he w ent  
about   i t   i n  a very  open-m i nded  wa y ,   and  wa s   not   prepared t o  accept  i t   at  any  cost.   I n 
hi s address to t he Cyprus Econom i c Society 1997 A nnual  Lecture (publ i shed in 
Ekonom i a, S u mme r  1998) he di scussed the “Pi t f all s and Pot enti al of Fi nanci al
Li berali sati on”,  and w arned of t he i m port ance of a num ber of prerequisit es for 
successful  fi nanci al li berali sati on pol i cies. Thi s paper is w ri t t en in t hat  spir i t  and 
based  on  hi s suggest i on,   and  as such i t   i s dedi cated t o  Ma x '   me mo r y.
The r ol e played by the fi nanci al sector i n an econom y can be i m port ant i n
det ermi ni ng econom i c grow t h.  A g r ow i ng em pi r i cal li t erature in fact dem onst r ates 
t hat   t he devel opm ent   of  t he f i nanci al  system  has posi t i ve eff ects on ( i )   t he l ong-run
r ate of  econom i c grow t h  and/ or  ( i i )   t he  vol um e  and/ or  eff i ciency of  i nvest me n t   ( Fr y,  
1995).   Ho we v e r ,  the causal nat ure of thi s relati onshi p i s now  know n t o exhi bi t  
consi derable vari ati on across count r i es (De me t r i ades and H ussein,  1996).  Thi s
i ndi cates t hat   i nst i t ut i onal   f actors or  pol i cies ma y   pl ay a cri t i cal  r ol e i n det ermi ni ng 
how  t he process of fi nanci al devel opm ent  aff ects econom i c grow t h (Ar esti s and 
De me t r i ades, 1997).  The i m port ance of i nst i t ut i onal  f actors is confi r m ed by
De mi r güç-K unt  and D et r agiache (1998),  w ho dem onst r ate that  inst i t ut i onal  qual i t y 
i s inversely related to t he i nci dence of f i nanci al f r agil i t y t hat  usual l y fol l ow s
episodes  of  f i nanci al  l i berali sati on.     The  r elevance of  f i nanci al  l i berali sati on  pol i cies 
i s hi ghl i ght ed by De me t r i ades and Lui nt el  ( 1996,   1997,   2001)  w ho dem onst r ate t hat  
t he di r ect eff ects of fi nanci al repression i n som e devel opi ng count r i es are m uch 
l arger than,  and i n som e i nst ances opposi t e t o,   t hose em anati ng f r om  changes i n t he 
r eal  i nt erest  r ate. 
*  We   benefi t ed  greatl y  f r om   c o mme n t s by  t he  part i cipant s t o  t he  Ma x we l l   Fr y  Me mo r i al  Conference 
at  t he  Bank  of  Engl and,   11  Ma y ,   2001,   and  by  t he  r eferees  c o mme n t s;  we   are  grat eful  t o  all   of  t hem .  
The  usual   di sclaime r   appl i es. 2
Wh i l e the m edi um -t erm c o s t s of fi nanci al l i berali sati on i n t erms  o f  hei ght ened 
f r agil i t y of  t he f i nanci al  system  are now  r ecogni sed,  i t s l onger-term  benefi t s,  albei t  
wi del y accepted,  r em ain unproven.     Ear l i er  em pir i cal  l i t erature,  wh i ch att em pted t o 
capture t hese  benefi t s by  f ocusi ng  on  t he  cross-count r y  r elati onshi p  bet w een t he  r eal 
i nt erest rate and econom i c grow t h and/ or the eff i ciency of invest me n t  (e.g.  Ge l b,  
1989),  is now  bel i eved t o have been fl aw ed.  In t hi s respect St i gl i t z (1998) argues 
t hat  t hese regressions suff er f r om  si mu l t aneit y and m i s-specif i cati on probl em s. 
Ar esti s and De me t r i ades ( 1997)  r einforce t hese cri t i cism s f ocusi ng on t he causali t y 
and het erogenei t y i ssues, nei t her  of  wh i ch can be addressed sati sfactori l y i n a cross-
secti on fr am ew ork.   O n the basi s of avail able em pir i cal li t erature, it  can safely be 
concl uded t hat  t here rem ains consi derable scope for f urt her r esearch int o t he
channels through w hi ch fi nanci al pol i ci es of vari ous t ypes,  i ncl udi ng fi nanci al
l i berali sati on,  ma y  a f f ect econom i c perf orm ance. O ne such a channel is fi nanci al 
devel opm ent .   The  f ocus  of  t hi s paper  i s t o  exam ine  em pir i call y  t hi s part i cular  venue 
of  f i nanci al  pol i cies.
We  p r ovi de an em pir i cal  assessm ent of the eff ects of fi nanci al pol i cies, incl udi ng 
f i nanci al  l i berali sati on,   on f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i n six devel opi ng econom i es.  The 
pol i cy data w ere coll ected eit her di r ectl y fr om  centr al banks or f r om  off i cial
publ i cati ons f or  a peri od of  over  f ort y years.    Specif i call y,   we   coll ected dat a on t wo  
t ypes of fi nanci al restr aint s, nam el y restr i cti ons on i nt erest rates and reserve and 
l i qui di t y requi r em ents. We  e s t i ma t e the eff ects of t hese pol i cies on fi nanci al
devel opm ent  usi ng t i me  s e r i es techni ques.   W e fi nd t hat  the eff ects of fi nanci al 
pol i cies on f i nanci al  devel opm ent   vary consi derably across count r i es.    Ou r   f i ndi ngs 
dem onst r ate that  fi nanci al li berali sati on i s a m uch m ore com plex process than has 
been assum ed by earl i er l i t erature and it s eff ects on fi nanci al devel opm ent  are 
am biguous.
The r est of the paper is organi sed as fol l ow s.   Secti on 2 provi des an out l i ne of 
r elevant  l i t erature and  draw s i t s i mp l i cati ons  f or  t he  eff ects of  t wo   t ypes  of  f i nanci al 
pol i cies on fi nanci al devel opm ent .  Secti on 3 provi des a sum m ary of the fi nanci al 
pol i cies data set.   Secti on 4 di scusses the econom et r i c m ethodol ogy pursued, and 
secti on  5  exam ines  t he  em pir i cal  r esult s.    Secti on  6  s u mma r i ses and  concl udes.3
2.   Fi nanci al   Pol i cies and  Fi nanci al   De v e l opm ent:   C onceptual   Issues
Ther e are vali d reasons w hy fi nanci al pol i cies, incl udi ng fi nanci al restr aint s, can 
have i m port ant real eff ects, on fi nanci al devel opm ent .   T o start  wi t h t here are the 
sem inal  cont r i but i ons of Mc Ki nnon (1973) and Shaw  (1973),  wh i ch predict that
i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s and  di r ected credit   program m es i mp e d e   t he  process of  f i nanci al 
deepening.
1 In cont r ast,  there is a sm all  but  grow i ng l i t erature, wh i ch em phasises 
f i nanci al ma r ket  i mp e r f ecti ons,  i ncl udi ng asym m et r i c informa t i on and i mp e r f ect 
com peti t i on,   t hat   arr i ves at  concl usi ons t hat   subst anti all y qual i f y t he predicti ons of 
t he fi nanci al li berali sati on t hesi s (St i gl i t z, 1994;  Ca pr i o,  1994;  Ge r t l er and Rose,  
1996;   He l l m ann  et  al,   1996a,   1996b,   2000).
Be s i des t hese m acroeconom i c approaches, there ar e also m odel s belongi ng t o t he 
l i t erature on  banki ng  t hat   i nvest i gat e t he  eff ects of  f i nanci al  r egul ati on  on  r i sk t aking 
by banks ( Ki m  and Sant om ero,   1988;   K eely and Fur l ong,   1990;   G ennot t e and Pyl e, 
1991).  Wh i l e the recent episodes of fi nanci al fr agil i t y (e.g.  Japan,  Eas t  As i a) have 
vi vi dl y dem onst r ated that  excessive ri sk-taking by fi nanci al inst i t ut i ons can t r i gger 
severe m acroeconom i c dow nt urns,  t he above m odel s do not  expl ore the w i der
m acroeconom i c i mp l i cati ons  of  t hese  t ypes  of  pol i cies. 
The em pirical l i t erature on t he eff ects of f i nanci al pol i cies has been recentl y
grow i ng rapidl y.  Exi sti ng m acro-econom et r i c studi es focus on a num ber of As i an 
econom i es, and reveal that  the eff ects of fi nanci al restr aint s m ay be very l arge but  
vary consi derably across count r i es (e.g.  De me t r i ades and Luint el,  1997;
De me t r i ades, De v e r eux and Lui nt el,  1998).  Cr oss-count r y grow t h regressions
i ndi cate that  fi nanci al restr aint s, wi t h perhaps t he excepti on of cont r ol s on capi t al 
out f l ow s,   ma y   ham per  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   ( R ossi,   1999).  
I n t he r est  of  t hi s secti on we   expl ore t he l i kel y m acroeconom i c eff ects of  t wo   broad 
t ypes of fi nanci al pol i cies, nam el y i nt erest rate restr aint s and reserve,  as w ell  as 
1 Ear l y cri t i cism  of the fi nanci al li berali sati on t hesi s em phasised str uct ural consi derati ons,  such as 
unoff i cial  credit   ma r ket s.  These ma y   r everse t he concl usi ons of  f i nanci al  l i berali sati on i f   i ncreases i n 
i nt erest rates in t he off i cial ma r ket s, fol l ow i ng t he rem oval  of cont r ol s, crow d out  loans i n t he
unoff i cial    ma r ket s ( Tayl or,   1983;   Va n   Wi j nebergen,   1983).4
l i qui di t y,  requi r em ents. The f i r st type of fi nanci al pol i cies are typi call y t he pri ma r y 
f ocus of fi nanci al li berali sati on progra mme s  wh i l e the second t ype of pol i cies are 
i ndi cati ve  of  t he  severi t y  of  f i nanci al  r epression.  
I nt erest  Rat e Res t raint s
I n Mc Ki nnon ( 1973)  and Shaw’ s ( 1973)  f r am ew ork,   i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s i nhi bi t s
f i nanci al  devel opm ent   l argel y by depressing r eal  i nt erest  r ates wh i ch i n t urn aff ects 
adversely econom i c grow t h.  I n t he M cK i nnon/ Shaw f r am ew ork,  i nt erest r ate
l i berali sati on,  by i ncreasing t he vol um e of bank asset s and l i abil i t i es, enhances t he 
devel opm ent  of the banki ng system . Ot hers, how ever,  have suggest ed that  in t he 
presence of i nforma t i on asym m et r i es, l i berali sati on of i nt erest r ates m ay not
necessari l y l ead to fi nanci al deepening (Schi antarell i  et al,  1994).   Indeed, t he 
com binat i on of  a s y mme t r i c i nforma t i on wi t h t he provi sion of  deposi t   i nsurance can 
l ead to excessivel y ri sky l endi ng st r ategies (Mc Ki nnon and Pi l l ,  1997),  and t o 
pot enti all y subst anti al increases in bad debt s (Ca pr i o,  1994).   Furt hermo r e, int ense 
com peti t i on t hat  usual l y fol l ow s fi nanci al l i berali sati on l ow ers profi t s for banks 
wh i ch in t urn erodes t hei r  fr anchise values,  increasing t he prem ium  for external  
f i nance,  and t hus l ow eri ng banks’ incenti ve for ma k i ng ‘good’ loans (Ca pr i o and 
S u mme r s, 1994;  Ge r t l er and Rose,  1996;  He l l m ann et  al,  1996b,  2000).   Thi s 
exacerbat es the probl em s of mo r al hazard and gam bl i ng behavi our in t he banki ng 
system , t hereby i ncreasing t he ri skiness of banks’ port f ol i os w hi ch in t urn m ay
aff ect adversely t he publ i c’s percepti on of the soundness of the banki ng system .
Consequent l y,   prudent   bank  behavi our  i s undermi ned  ( He l l ma n   et  al  2000),   wi t h  t he 
probabi l i t y of fi nanci al cri ses being enhanced subst anti all y (Ak e r l of and Rom er,  
1993).
I ndeed, som e types of fi nanci al restr aint s, such as int erest rate ceil i ngs on deposi t  
r ates, by keepi ng profi t  ma r gi ns w i t hi n cert ain l i mi t s, can in fact r educe the
probl em s of mo r al hazard and adverse selecti on (St i gl i t z, 1994).   In t hi s w ay, 
f i nanci al  r estr aint s ma y   r educe t he r i skiness of  banks’  port f ol i os by l i mi t i ng banks’
i ncenti ves t o i nvest  in assets that  facil i t ate gam bli ng.  Consequent l y,  int erest rate 
ceil i ngs can encourage fi nanci al devel opm ent  by enhanci ng t he soundness of the 
dom est i c banki ng  system  ( Ar esti s and  De me t r i ades,  1997).I n  He l l ma n   et  al  ( 1994a,  5
1994b,  1996a,  1996b) t hese i deas are appli ed to deposi t  m obi l i sati on,  wh i ch is 
cruci al  t o  m any  devel opi ng  count r i es.    D eposi t   r ate cont r ol s i n  part i cular,   ensure t hat  
com peti t i on w i l l  not  dri ve t he m argi n bet w een lendi ng and deposi t  rates dow n t o 
zero.   They are, thus,  a pow erf ul  inst r um ent  to fi nanci al deepening by al l ow i ng 
pri vat e deposi t   ma r ket s t o  grow .
Fur t hermo r e, by l i mi t i ng deposi t  r ates at bel ow  com peti t i ve equi l i bri um  rates,
governm ent s create rent opport uni t i es, wh i ch the banki ng sect or coul d ut i l i se for 
wh a t  is terme d  ` educati onal  advert i sing cam pai gn' ,  a tool  of non-pri ce com peti t i on 
wh i ch facil i t ates the m obi l i sati on of deposi t s, thereby enhanci ng furt her fi nanci al 
deepening.  Thi s argum ent  has been t aken a step furt her in H el l ma n  e t  al (2000) 
wh e r e i t   i s dem onst r ated t hat   i n  a dynam i c m odel   of  mo r al  hazard,   com peti t i on  has  a 
harmf ul  eff ect on banks’ fr anchise value (t he capit ali sed val ue of expected fut ure 
profi t s).  D eposi t -rate contr ol s as a tool  of prudent i al regul ati on t o prevent mo r al 
hazard,   produces  Par eto-eff i cient  pol i cies.
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R eserve and  Li qui di t y Requi rem ents 
A dvocat es of  f i nanci al  l i berali sati on  consi der  r eserve  and  l i qui di t y  r equi r em ents as a 
t ax on f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on,   wh i ch wi dens t he spread bet w een deposi t   and l oan 
i nt erest rat e and reduces the si ze of the fi nanci al system  (Fr y,  1995).  H ence, the 
abol i t i on of  r eserve r equi r em ents,  by i ncreasing t he size of  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ati on 
and rem ovi ng t he di stort i onary eff ects of the t ax, is li kel y t o result  in a deeper 
f i nanci al system .  Thi s argum ent  i s imp l i cit l y based on t he assum pti on t hat
governm ent   r evenue f r om   r eserve  and  l i qui di t y  r equi r em ents i s used  unproduct i vel y,  
probabl y t o f i nance governm ent   consum pt i on.   I f   t hese r esources are i nst ead used t o 
f i nance product i ve publ i c i nvest me n t ,   t hen t hi s concl usi on ma y   not   f ol l ow .   Mu c h   of 
t he  l i t erature on  i nfr astr uct ure,  i n  f act,   dem onst r ates t hat   i nvest me n t   i n  publ i c capit al 
2  A  r elated poi nt   i s t hat   i nt erest  r ate r estr i cti ons generate scope f or  r ati oni ng credit   i n accordance  t o 
nat i onal  pri ori t i es through di r ected credit  progra mme s .  Wh i l e in m any count r i es dir ected credit  
progra mme s   f ail ed  t o  achieve  eff i ciency  gai ns,   som e governm ent s have  been  successful   i n  channeli ng 
credit  tow ards proj ects w it h hi gh soci al returns,  wh i ch m ay have been unprofi t able to fi nance w i t h 
t he  hi gher  i nt erest  r ates t hat   usual l y  prevail   i n  l i berali sed credit   ma r ket s ( Ca l om i r i s and  Hi mme l berg,  
1994).   For   exam ple,  i n  som e Eas t   As i an count r i es t he  wi l l i ngness  t o  adapt  credit   pol i cies t o  changing 
cir cum stances and the use of cont ests based on export  perf orm ance to gui de di r ected credit
progra mme s   are bel i eved t o  have  cont r i but ed signi f i cantl y  t o  t he  eff ecti veness  of  t hese  progra mme s  
( Wo r l d  Bank,   1993) .6
has l arge posi t i ve eff ects on t he product i vi t y of pri vat e capit al (A schauer,  1989;  
Lynde and Ri chm ond,  1993;  Na d i r i  and M am uneas,  1994;  De me t r i ades and
M am uneas, 2000).   If  thi s is the case then reserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ents are 
l i kel y t o boost  econom i c grow t h,  t hereby al so li kel y t o enhance fi nanci al
devel opm ent .   A ddi t i onal l y,  reserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ent pol i cies, if  appl i ed 
properl y,   ma y   have mo r e di r ect  eff ects on t he devel opm ent   of  t he f i nanci al  system  
by ensuri ng t hat   banks are suff i cientl y l i qui d i n order  t o be able t o m eet  day-t o-day
wi t hdraw als by deposi t ors. Mi ni mu m r eserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ents are
part i cularl y useful  w hen m oney m arket s are not  suff i cientl y deep or devel oped,  
wh i ch is fr equent l y t he case in devel opi ng count r i es. But  even in ‘deep’ fi nanci al 
ma r ket s,  r eserve and l i qui di t y r equi r em ents can pl ay a useful   r ol e,  especiall y wh e n  
t here i s i mp e r f ect  i nforma t i on about   a bank’s solvency.     I n pri nci pl e,  a bank t hat   i s 
solvent  ma y  s t i l l  face an imb a l ance betw een short -term  paym ent s and short -term
i ncom e;  borr ow i ng t hrough t he i nt er-bank m arket  to cl ose t hi s li qui di t y gap i s, of 
course, possibl e. Ho we v e r ,  fr equent  li qui di t y short ages m ay generate bad si gnal s 
concerni ng sol vency t hrough t he i nt er-bank m arket .   A s a result ,  w hol esale banks 
ma y   r efuse t o provi de an i l l i qui d bank wi t h t he necessary f unds.   Consequent l y,   t he 
i l l i qui d bank ma y   be forced t o sell   l ong-t erm  assets at  di str ess pri ces,  l ow eri ng t he 
val ue of i t s assets. H ence, wh a t  start s as a probl em  of l i qui di t y m ay w el l  be 
t r anslated i nt o  a probl em  of  i nsol vency  ( De wa t r i pont   and  Ti r ol e,  1993).
3.   Fi nanci al   Pol i cies and  Ot her Da t a 
The f i nanci al pol i cies data used for thi s analysi s have been uni quel y const r uct ed 
f r om   i nforma t i on  avail able i n  t he  Ce nt r al  Bank  annual   r eport s f r om   each count r y f or 
t he  peri od  1955  t o  1997.   The  pol i cies com pri se i nt erest  r ate cont r ol s and  r eserve  and 
l i qui di t y requi r em ents. Tabl e  1  s u mma r i ses the m ai n fi nanci al pol i cies for our
sam ple of count r i es, and provi des t he basi s for t he const r uct i on of t he t wo
quant i t ati ve  s u mma r y  m easures of  f i nanci al  r estr aint s. 
I t   i s clear  f r om  Tabl e 1 t hat   t he count r i es i ncl uded i n our  sam ple have had di f f erent 
experi ences in t erms  o f  the t i mi ng and speed of int erest rate li berali sati on.  Som e 
count r i es such as K orea, Gr eece, Phi l i ppi nes and Egypt  fol l ow ed a very gradual  7
process of fi nanci al li berali zati on w hi l e others such as Thail and aboli shed ceil i ngs
on  l endi ng  and  deposi t   r ates wi t hi n  a very  short   peri od  of  t i me .   Wh a t   i s i nt eresti ng  t o 
not e is that  in al l  these count r i es, the governm ent  resort ed to cont r ol s bot h on t he 
l endi ng and deposi t  rates, wh i ch is in cont r ast wi t h t he experi ence of devel oped 
count r i es. The sequence of i nt erest r ate deregul ati on w as al so dif f erent across 
count r i es.  I n Gr eece and Egypt   cont r ol s on l endi ng and deposi t   r ates we r e abol i shed 
simu l t aneously.   I n Thai l and and Phi l i ppi nes,   deposi t   r ates we r e l i berali sed f i r st  and 
t hen l endi ng r ates,  wh i l e i n Ko r ea i t   wa s   t he ot her  wa y   around.   I t   i s also i nt eresti ng 
t o not e that  in t he case of Indi a, fi nanci al li berali sati on di d not  run sm oot hl y and 
t here have  been som e episodes  of  r eform  r eversal.  
The count r i es in t he sam pl e have di f f erent experi ences regardi ng l i qui di t y and 
r eserve requi r em ents. Phi l i ppi nes and K orea did not  im pose any forma l  li qui di t y 
r ati os.   Thi s i s i n cont r ast  wi t h I ndi a wh i ch i m posed hi gh l i qui di t y r ati os wh e r e i n t he 
1980s  and  t he  1990s  t hese r ati os  r eached as hi gh  as 38. 5% ,   and  i n  Egypt   wh e r e t hey 
r eached 30%  in t he peri od 1960-1990.   A not her count r y t hat  resort ed heavil y t o 
l i qui di t y rati os i n t he 1980s i s G reece w here banks w ere requi r ed to i nvest  cert ain 
f r acti on of t hei r  t ot al deposi t s  i n short  t erm  governm ent  bonds.  Ho we v e r ,  t hese 
l i qui di t y r equi r em ents we r e abol i shed i n 1993.   As   f or  r eserve r equi r em ents,  all   t he 
count r i es i n our  sam ple have used r eserve r equi r em ents f or  t he conduct   of  m onet ary 
pol i cy at som e stage. Gr eece, Phi l i ppi nes,  Ko r ea, Indi a and Egypt  resort ed to very 
hi gh reserve requi r em ents alt hough i n t he 1990s G reece and K orea low ered thei r  
r eserve requi r em ents consi derably.  The onl y excepti on i s T hail and,  wh e r e reserve 
r equi r em ents we r e set  at  very  l ow   l evels t hroughout   t he sam ple peri od.
Cons t ructi on  of  pol i cy  variabl es
I n t hi s sub-secti on w e expl ain t he const r uct i on of the pol i cy vari ables used in t he 
esti ma t i ons.  The num ber of pol i cy vari ables w as determi ned t hrough st ati sti cal
cri t eri a,  wh i ch i ncl uded  essenti all y  t he  preventi on  of  mu l t i coll i neari t y.   Thi s suggest ed 
keeping t he num ber  of  pol i cy vari ables as l ow  as possibl e.  Thus,   cont r ol s on deposi t  
and l endi ng r ates we r e me r ged i nt o one s u mma r y m easure l abeled I RR.   Specif i call y,  
I RR i s an unw eight ed average of deposi t  rat e and lendi ng rate contr ol  d u mmi es 
( wh i ch take the val ue of 1 i f  a contr ol  i s present,  and 0 ot herwi se).  The hi gh8
corr elati on  bet w een reserve and l i qui di t y r equir em ents suggest ed t he constr uct i on of 
one sum m ary m easure, usi ng t he pri nci pal  com ponent  me t hod.  Mo r e precisely,  we  
ut i l i se t he  f i r st  pri nci pal   com ponent   wh i ch i s posi t i vel y  and  hi ghl y  corr elated wi t h  t he 
underl yi ng vari ables ( t hi s i s l abell e d PCRLR) .  The var i able ‘Re s e r ve Requi r em ents’ 
i s also ut i l i sed as a separate vari able i n  t hose  count r i es wh e r e t here we r e no  l i qui di t y 
r equi r em ents.  Tabl e 2 cit es t he corr elati on ma t r i ces f or  all   six count r i es and f or  all  
t he pol i cy vari ables uti l i sed over the peri od of invest i gat i on.  It  is clear fr om  t hi s 
Tabl e that  t he const r uct ed pol i cy vari ables, i . e. I RR a n d PCRLR,  are highl y
corr elated wi t h  t he  underl yi ng  vari ables i n  each count r y.  
The  r est  of  t he vari ables we r e const r uct ed as f ol l ow s.  Fi nanci al  devel opm ent  ( FD)   i s 
m easured by t he r ati o of  nom i nal  li qui d l i abil i t i es to nom i nal   GDP.
3  The  dat a source 
ort hi s vari able  i s   t he Financi al   D evelopm ent   Da t abase  of   t he  Wo r l d  Bank.   Econom i c 
devel opm ent  (GDPK)  is m easured by t he rati o of real GDP t o popul ati on.  The dat a 
source for bot ht hese vari ables isI nt ernat i onal  Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs (CD ROM ,
1998: 6).   The  r eal  r ate of  i nt erest  wa s   const r uct ed by  t aking  t he  di f f erence bet w een t he 
nom i nal   r ate of  i nt erest  ( di scount   r ate)  and t he expected i nfl ati on r ate ( proxi ed by t he 
curr ent GDP d e f l ator) .  These vari ables w ere also coll ected fr om Int ernat i onal
Fi nanci al  St at i sti cs (CD ROM ,  1998: 6).  The pol i cy vari ables are constr uct ed using 
dat a f r om   annual   r eport s of  centr al  banks.
4.   Econom etric Me t hodol ogy
We   esti ma t e t he  f ol l ow i ng  m odel   of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent :
LFDt   =  b0    + b1LGDPKt     +  b2RI RDt   +  b  3  I RR  t + b4RLRt + et                         ( 1)
wh e r e LFD  is the l ogari t hm  of fi nanci al devel opm ent ,  LGDPK i s the l ogari t hm  of 
econom i c devel opm ent ,  RI RD i s the real int erest rate, IRR r epresents int erest rate 
r estr aint s  a nd RLR r epresents reserve requi r em ent and l i qui di t y rati os.  LGDPK i s 
entered to capture the relati onshi p bet w een fi nanci al devel opm ent  and econom i c 
acti vi t y t hat   em anates f r om  t he dem and side ( and,   t hus,   expected t o have a posi t i ve 
3  Li qui d  l i abil i t i es  are  defi ned  as  curr ency  hel d  out side  t he  banki ng  system   pl us  dem and  and  i nt erest 
beari ng  l i abil i t i es  of  t he  banks  and  non- bank  f i nanci al  i nt erme d i ari es.9
sign).   RI RD  shoul d i nfl uence f i nanci al  deepening posi t i vel y i n vi ew  of  t he f i nanci al 
l i berali sati on  hypot heses.
Ou r  econom et r i c fr am ew ork i s based on devel opm ent s in coi nt egrati on and Err or 
Cor r ecti on M odel  (ECM ) .  In t he fi r st step w e use Johansen’s (1988) coint egrati on 
approach t o obt ain t he l ong-run coint egrati ng r elati onshi ps bet w een t he  vari ables of 
t he system .  Ho we v e r ,   t he short -run str uct ure of  t he m odel   i s also i m port ant  i n t erms  
of t he i nforma t i on i t  conveys,  wh i ch is associated w it h t he short -run adj ust me n t  
behavi our of econom i c vari ables. Ther efore, in t he second st ep w e esti ma t e t he 
short -run  VAR  i n  err or  corr ecti on  f orm  wi t h  uni quel y  i dent i f i ed coint egrati ng  vector 
and obt ain a parsim oni ous version of t he st ati sti cal m odel  under consi derati on.  
Fi nal l y,  w e condi t i on on w eakl y exogenous vari ables obt aini ng a condi t i onal
Par sim oni ous  V ector  Er r or  Cor r ecti on  M odel .
4  Er i scsson ( 1995)  show s  t hat   i n  m any 
cases w eak exogenei t y i mp l i es t he existence of  condi t i onal   ECM ,   wh i l e a str uct ural 
ECM ,   i n t erms   of  Bos wi j k ( 1995),   does not   exist.   I n part i cular,   Er i csson argues t hat  
a parsim oni ous  condi t i onal   ECM   can be  str uct ural  i n  H endry’s ( 1993)  defi ni t i on  but  
not   str uct ural  i n Bos wi j k’s sense.  I n t hi s paper  we   f ol l ow  H endry’s defi ni t i on wh e r e 
str uct ure i s a set  of  basi c i nvari ant  att r i but es of  t he econom i c m echanism .  Thus,   t he 
param etersq˛Q Q  defi ne a str uct ure i f   t hey are bei ng i nvari ant  over  extension of  t he 
i nforma t i on  set  i n  t i me ,   i nt ervent i ons  or  vari ables.
5
To  i l l ust r ate t he m odel l i ng of  a l i near  dynam i c system  we   consi der  a t w o-equat i on
m odel  wh e r e the endogenous vari ables are Financi al De v e l opm ent  and G D P per 
capit a.  We   t r eat  t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate as an exogenous vari able,  wh i ch i mp l i es t hat   i t  
can be incl uded i n t he coi nt egrati on space but it s m argi nal  di str i but i on does not  
convey  any  i nforma t i on  f or  t he  condi t i onal   m odel .   Ther efore,  r eal  i nt erest  r ates need 
not   be  m odel l ed.  Pol i cy vari ables are used  eit her  as exogenous  or  unrestr i cted.  To  be 
mo r e precise, the t r eatme n t  of det ermi ni sti c vari ables are im port ant for the proper 
specif i cati on of a stati sti cal m odel  and t herefore for successful  em pir i cal analysi s. 
4  I n  part i cular,   we   have  onl y  t wo   endogenous  vari ables  and  we   norma l i se wi t h  r espect  t o  one  of  t hem ,  
wh i ch i s consi stent  wi t h  t he  purpose  of  t hi s paper.
5  W here Q i s the param eters space of the st r uct ural m odel  (i . e a m odel defi ned by t he econom i c 
t heory).   For   a  det ail ed  analysi s   of  str uct ural  and  stati sti cal  m odel s see  Spanos  ( 1989  and  1990).10
Fol l ow i ng  H endry  and  D oorni k  ( 1994)  we   t est  f or  t he  val i di t y  of  condi t i oni ng  on  t he 
pol i c y  d u mmi es, wh i ch m ay proxy endogenous responses by pol i cy m akers to 
exogenous  shocks.     As   a f i r st  step we   t r eat  pol i cy vari ables as exogenous  and t est  f or 
t hei r  signi f i cance in t he coi nt egrati on space. Even i f  pol i cy vari ables are found 
signi f i cant in t he l ong-run i m pact  ma t r i x,   we   check wh e t her  t he r esult s are sensibl e 
f r om  an econom i c t heory poi nt   of  vi ew  and com pare t hem  t o t hose obt ained wh e n  
pol i cy vari ables enter  t he  system  unrestr i cted.
I n  s u mma r y  our  econom et r i c me t hodol ogy  i ncl udes  t he  f ol l ow i ng  t hree steps:
1) W e  wr i t e ( 1)  i n  a VAR  f orm:




= ∑F  +  Y Dt   +  et                                               ( 2)
wh e r ex t
’ = [ LFDt , , LGDPKt ]a n dDt i ncl udes t he pol i cy vari ables. W e appl y t he 
Johansen coi nt egrati on t echni que t o est i ma t e the num ber of coint egrati ng vect ors. 
We   i dent i f y t he uni que coint egrati ng vectors wh i ch are one i n all   countr i es wi t h t he 
excepti on of  I ndi a ( see secti on 5 bel ow  f or  t he r elevant  det ail s).   Ther efore,  t here i s 
no need t o i dent i f y t he coi nt egrati ng vect or by i m posi ng restr i cti ons on t he
coint egrati ng  space ( again  except  f or  I ndi a).
2)  In t he second st age w e esti ma t e an EC M  and therefore w e reparam etari se the 
G aussian VAR  as f ol l ow s:




= ∑F   +  Y Dt  +  e t                                                                                                                                          ( 3)
f or (n·r) m atr i x of coint egrati ng vect or b  and (n·r)  we i ght i ng a.  M odel  (3) is a 
r educed form  and consequent l y t here are simu l t aneit y eff ects betw een the
endogenous  vari ables of  t he  system ,  i . e.  Fi nanci al  De v e l opm ent   and  GDP  per  capit a. 
Ho we v e r ,  t he si gni f i cance of t he el em ents of ma t r i x a i ndi cates w hether t he 
vari ables under  consi derati on r eact  t o t he equi l i bri um  err or.   The  vari able t hat   i s not  
aff ected by t he err or corr ecti on t erm i s w eakly exogenous w i t h respect t o t he
coint egrati ng vect or and w e have t o proceed by esti ma t i ng (3) wi t hout taking i nt o 11
account   t he di str i but i on of  t hat   exogenous vari able.  I n part i cular,   we   can part i t i on xt
as ( y t ’   :   xt ’ )   i n  wh i ch case ( 3)  ma y   be  r ew ri t t en as a condi t i onal   m odel   f or  y t ,   gi ven xt:




= ∑ * F j   +  Y *D t   +  vt vt∼NI ( 0,Sv)           ( 4)
and t he ma r gi nal   m odel   f or  zas:




= ∑ * F 2j   +  Y 2Dt   +  e2t e 2t∼NI ( 0,S22)             ( 5)
wh e r eB *   = S12S22
- 1,ac  =  a1 – B*a2, ,F1j*= F 1j- B*F 2j ,Y *=Y 1t *-B*Y 2t *,vt =e 1t -
B*e2t   ,   Sv= S11 -S12S22
- 1S21,   ma t r i ces are part i t i oned  conforma b l y  wi t h ( y t’:   x t’ ) ,   and 
subscri pt s indi cate the relevant sub-m atr i x.  Johansen (1995) show s t hat  if  a2 =  0 
t hen zt  i s w eakly exogenous for param eters (b, a1)  and t he m axi mu m l i kel i hood 
esti ma t or  of  b  anda1  can be  calculated f r om   t he  condi t i onal   m odel .
2) In  t he  f i nal   stage we   esti ma t e ( 3)  condi t i onal   on  exogenous  vari ables,  i . e.:




= ∑F  +  Y Dt   +  et                                                                           ( 6)
wh e r e x  i s t he  sam e as x  excludi ng  t he  exogenous  vari ables z t;   equat i on  6  i s actual l y 
equi val ent  t o ( 4).   Bos wi j k ( 1995)  proposed t he not i on of  str uct ural  ECM   wh i ch i s a 
r epresentati on of  condi t i onal   ECM   t hat   sati sfi es cert ain r estr i cti ons.   Er i csson ( 1995) 
show s t hat   vi ol ati on of  t hi s r estr i cti on can l ead t o a condi t i onal   ECM   wh i ch ma y   be 
str uct ural i n a sense ot her t han Bosw i j k’s.
6 I n our case w here w e have t wo
endogenous vari ables,  exogenei t y of  one of  t hem  i mp l i es a str uct ural  ECM   t hat   also 
sati sfi es Bos wi j k’s r estr i cti ons.
5.   Empi rical  Re s ul t s
We   began  by  exam ini ng  t he  degree of  i nt egrati on  of  each vari able,  wh i ch wa s   f ound 
t o be I ( 1)  i n all   cases,  except  f or  t he pol i cy vari ables wh i ch are d u mmi es.
7  We   t hen 
proceeded to conduct  Johansen’s coint egrati on analysi s. The r esult s of the l att er 
6  Pr em ult i pl yi ng  ( 4)  by  a  nonsi gul ar  ma t r i x  A,   t he  structural   M odel   can  be  obt ained.12
exercise suggest  t he  existence of  one  coint egrati ng  vector  i n  f i ve  of  t he  six  count r i es 
i ncl uded i n t he sam pl e. The excepti on i s Indi a w here w e found t wo  c o i nt egrati ng 
vectors. We ,  thus,  im posed t wo  r estr i cti ons i n t hi s case, in addi t i on t o t hose on 
norma l i sati on i n order to exactl y i dent i f y t he coi nt egrati ng vect ors. In al l  six cases 
w e norma l i se the equat i on accordi ng t o fi nanci al devel opm ent  all ow i ng us t o
i nt erpret  t he  coint egrati ng  vector  as a f i nanci al  devel opm ent   equat i on.   Al l   t he  r esult s 
r eport ed i n Tabl es 3A  and 4 and di scussed i n t hi s secti on,   bot h f or  t he unrestr i cted 
VAR a n d  t he ECM  relati onshi ps,  do not  suff er fr om  (singl e equati on or vector)  
autocorr elati on,  het eroscedasti cit y and non-norma l i t y,  as suggest ed by t he relevant 
stati sti cs and  di agnost i cs r eport ed i n  Tabl e 3B.   Ther e are t wo   excepti ons  t o  t hi s.  The 
f i r st i s in t he case of Thai l and,  wh e r e the t ests for autocorr elati on i n t h e  GDP 
equat i on and f or  vector  non-norma l i t y are onl y ma r gi nal l y accepted at  t he 5 percent 
l evel.   The  second  i s r elated t o  Gr eece,  wh e r e i n  t he  Fi nanci al  De v e l opm ent   equat i on 
t here is evidence of signi f i cant ARCH e f f ects. Ho we v e r ,  Cheung and Lai  (1993) 
show  t hat   wh e n   t he r esidual s i n t he VAR  f ol l ow  a m ovi ng average process t hen t he 
r elevant  AI C  ma y   be  unreli able.  U nder  t hese  cir cum stances one  can onl y  specif y  t he 
V A R  system  on t he basi s of the uncorr elate d  VAR r esidual s; in our case th e  VAR
r esidual s are i ndeed uncorr elated ( see Tabl e 3B).
Tabl e 3A  report s the norma l i sed coint egrati ng vect ors w it h respect t o fi nanci al
devel opm ent .  On  t he w hol e, the est i ma t ed coeff i cients are reasonabl e in t erms  o f  
bot h  size and  sign.   GDP  per  capit a enters wi t h  t he  expected posi t i ve  coeff i cient  i n  all  
count r i es indi cati ng t hat  hi gher level of econom i c devel opm ent  is associated w it h 
hi gher level of fi nanci al devel opm ent .  The r eal int erest rate enters w it h a posi t i ve 
coeff i cient,  wi t h t he excepti on of Ko r ea w here the coeff i cient i s negat i ve and
i nsi gni f i cant,   and  Thai l and  wh e r e dat a on  t hi s vari able are unavai l able.
As  t o t he i m pact of fi nanci al pol i cies, w e obt ain som e very i nt eresti ng result s. In 
Phi l i ppi nes,   I ndi a and Egypt ,   t he f i nanci al  pol i cy vari ables enter  i n t he coint egrati ng 
vector  i ndi cati ng t hat   t hese pol i cies have l ong-run eff ects on f i nanci al  devel opm ent .  
Specif i call y,  in t he case of Phi l i ppi nes i nt erest rate restr aint s have a negat i ve and 
signi f i cant infl uence,  wh i l e in al l  the ot her count r i es the eff ect is insi gni f i cant (i n 
Egypt  it  appears w it h a posi t i ve and i nsi gni f i cant coeff i cient;  excludi ng i t  aff ects 
7  The  r esult s of  t he  i nt egrati on  t ests are  avail able  f r om   t he  authors upon  r equest .13
adversely t he ot her  vari ables i ncl uded i n t he coint egrati ng vector) .   The  Re s e r ve and 
Li qui di t y Requi r em ents vari able enters negat i vel y i n t he coi nt egrati ng vect or for 
Egypt ,   and  i s signi f i cant  at  t he  5%   l evel.   I n  t he  case of  I ndi a i t   enters signi f i cantl y  ( at 
t he  1%   l evel)   wi t h  a posi t i ve  coeff i cient.   I n  cont r ast,   f i nanci al  pol i cies do  not   have  a 
signi f i cant  l ong-run  eff ect  on  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i n  Ko r ea,  Thai l and  and  Gr eece.
These result s indi cate that  inst i t ut i onal  factors, wh i ch vary consi derably across our 
sam ple of count r i es, m ay be pl aying a cri t i cal rol e in det ermi ni ng how  fi nanci al 
pol i cies aff ect  t he  process of  f i nanci al  devel opm ent .     I m port antl y,   f i nanci al  r estr aint s 
som eti m es appear to have posi t i ve l ong-run eff ects, suggest i ng t hat  mo r e com plex 
f actors ma y   be at  wo r k i n t he f i nanci al  deepening process t han wa s   t hought   by t he 
t r adit i onal  l i t erature on fi nanci al l i berali sati on.  As  e x p l ained i n secti on 2,  recent 
t heoreti cal m odel s predict t hat  f i nanci al r estr aint s m ay pl ay a prudent i al r ol e,
l i mi t i ng m oral hazard behavi our by banks,  in w hi ch case the relevant coeff i cient 
ma y   be expected t o be posi t i ve.   I n practi ce,  t hi s ma y   r efl ect  i ncreased confi dence i n 
t he banki ng system , wh i ch m ay produce a ri ght wa r d shi f t  in t he fi nanci al saving 
f unct i on.   T his eff ect is over and above t he eff ect of the real int erest rate, wh i ch 
shoul d  be  i nt erpreted as a m ovem ent  al ong  t he  sam e f unct i on.   Thi s r i ght wa r d  shif t   i n 
t he fi nanci al saving funct i on m ay refl ect r esponses t o fi nanci al pol i cies through
changes i n t he degree of  acti ve l i abil i t y m anagem ent   by banks,   wh i ch ma y   t ake t he 
f orm  of  non-pri ce acti vi t i es such as varyi ng  t he  num ber  of  branches and  t he  i nt ensit y
of  ma r ket i ng  acti vi t y.
I n  t he  second  stage and  i n  t he  case of  f i ve  count r i es,  GDP  per  capit a does  not   r eact  t o 
an err or  corr ecti on  specif i cati on.   Consequent l y,   t hi s vari able i s w eakly  exogenous  t o 
t he coint egrati ng vector.   As   suggest ed above ( secti on 4),   under  t hese cir cum stances 
w e can proceed w it h t he est i ma t i on of t he fi nanci al devel opm ent  vari able as a 
parsim oni ous ECM  condi t i onal  on G D P per capit a being exogenous.  Tabl e 4
cont ains t he result s of t he parsim oni ous ECM  speci f i cati on of t he fi nancial
devel opm ent  equat i on.  The short  run eff ects of fi nanci al restr aint s are m ixed.  In 
Ko r ea, i nt erest r ate restr aint s exert  a negat i ve short -run eff ect on fi nanci al
devel opm ent ,  wh e r eas in G reece and Indi a thei r  eff ect is found t o be posi t i ve and 
signi f i cant.   I n Phi l i ppi nes,   Thai l and and Egypt   i nt erest  r ate r estr aint s are not   f ound 
t o  have  a signi f i cant  i m pact  on  f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i n  t he  short   r un.  14
As  t o reserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ents, t hei r  short -run i m pact on fi nanci al
devel opm ent  also vari es across count r i es. Re s e r ve requi r em ents enter wi t h a
negat i ve sign,   but   wi t h varyi ng degrees of  signi f i cance,  i n Ko r ea and Thai l and.   On  
t he ot her hand,  reserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ents do not  seem  to have a short  run 
i m pact on fi nanci al devel opm ent  in Phi l i ppi nes,  Gr eece, Indi a and Egypt .  These 
mi xed result s refl ect the am bi gui t y at  the t heoreti cal level of the i m pact of reserve 
and  l i qui di t y  r equi r em ents on  f i nanci al  dept h,   as di scussed i n  secti on  2.
6.   S u mma r y   and  Co nc l udi ng  Re ma r ks
Thi s paper provi des a novel  assessm ent of the eff ects of several types of fi nanci al 
pol i cies on f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i n six count r i es.    Specif i call y,   i t   uses a new  dat a 
set on i nt erest rate restr aint s and reserve and l i qui di t y requi r em ents for a peri od of 
f ort y years, the coll ecti on of wh i ch represented a m ajor research eff ort .   It  ut i l i ses 
m odern t i me   seri es me t hods t o exam ine t he eff ects of  f i nanci al  pol i cies on f i nanci al 
devel opm ent ,   cont r ol l i ng  f or  t he  l evel  of  econom i c devel opm ent .
Ou r  em pir i cal fi ndi ngs dem onst r ate that  the real int erest rate has a posi t i ve and 
signi f i cant  l ong r un eff ect  on f i nanci al  devel opm ent   i n f our  out   of  t he six count r i es 
exam ined and no si gni f i cant eff ect in t he ot her tw o cases (but  posi t i ve i n one of 
t hem ).  Ho we v e r ,  our fi ndi ngs dem onst r ate, as M ax Fry suspected, t hat  fi nanci al
pol i cies have addi t i onal  di rect signi f i cant long-run and short -run eff ects.  These 
di r ect eff ects vary consi derably across count r i es, and w e bel i eve that  thi s vari ati on 
ma y  r efl ect inst i t ut i onal  di f f erences, such as the qual i t y of prudent i al supervi sion.  
I nt eresti ngl y,  we  f i nd t hat  wh i l e fi nanci al restr aint s in som e cases have negat i ve 
di r ect eff ects, t here are also cases w here thei r  eff ects are posi t i ve.   Thus,  our 
em pir i cal f i ndi ngs dem onst r ate that  t he m ai n predict i ons of t he fi nanci al
l i berali sati on l i t erature do not  r eceive ful l  em pir i cal support ,  a result  wh i ch is
consi stent  wi t h  t he  prevalence of  f i nanci al  ma r ket   i mp e r f ecti ons.  
Sever al  f r ui t f ul   avenues f or  f urt her  r esearch em erge  f r om   our  f i ndi ngs.   On e   pl ausi bl e
conj ecture i s t hat   f i nanci al  r estr aint s have posi t i ve eff ects on f i nanci al  devel opm ent  
wh e r e inst i t ut i onal  qual i t y,  such as prudent i al regul ati on and supervi sion,  is w eak.
To t est t hi s conj ecture one w oul d requi r e data on t he qual i t y of t he regul atory15
r egime ,  a chall engi ng but  wo r t hw hi l e endeavor.  Ot her i nst i t ut i onal  qual i t y
i ndi cators, such as the qual i t y of legal rul es and law  enforcem ent,  have been used 
successful l y i n relati on t o t he devel opm ent  of capit al ma r ket s (e.g.  La Por t a et al,  
1997).   A ddi t i onal l y,  as M ax Fry (1995,  1998) also indi cated, t here are under-
r esearched t heoreti cal  aspects t o  be  expl ored wi t h  r espect  t o  t he  r elati onshi p  bet w een 
f i nanci al li berali sati on and fi nanci al regul ati on,  incl udi ng t he i nt eracti ons bet w een 
prudent i al and m onet ary cont r ol .  Consequent l y,  furt her wo r k on t hese,  and related 
i ssues, i s li kel y t o produce useful  i nsi ght s int o t he eff ecti veness of f i nanci al
l i berali sati on  i n  devel opi ng  econom i es.
Re f erences
Ak e r l of,   G.   and P.   Rome r   ( 1993),   “Loot i ng:   The  Econom i cs U nderwo r l d of  Bankrupt cy f or  Pr ofi t ”, 
Brooki ng  Papers  on  Econom i c  Act i vit y.
Ar esti s, P. ,  and P. O.  De me t r i ades  (1997),  “ Financi al De v e l opm ent  and Econom i c G row t h:
A ssessing  The  Evi dence”,  The  Econom i c  Journal ,   Vo l .   107,   783-799.
A schauer,   D. A.   ( 1989),   “Is Publ i c Expendi t ure Pr oduct i ve?”, Journal   of   M onet ary  Econom i cs,   Vo l .  
23,   177-200.
Bos wi j k,  H.  P.  ( 1995),  “Eff i cient I nference in Coi nt egrati on Param eters in St r uct ural Er r or
Cor r ecti on  M odel s”,  Journal   of   Econom et rics,   Vo l .   69,   113-158.
Ca l om i r i s, C. W.  and C. P.  Hi mme l berg (1994),  “D ir ected C redit  Pr ogra mme s  f or Ag r i cult ure and 
I ndust r y:   Ar gum ent s f r om   Theor y  and  Fact”,  Proceedings  of   t he  Wo r l d  Bank  Annual   Conf erence on 
D evelopm ent   Econom i cs1993,   113-154.
Ca pr i o,  G.  ( 1994),  “B anking on Fi nanci al Re f or m?  A Ca s e  o f  Sensi t i ve D ependence on Ini t i al 
Condi t i ons”,  i n G .  Ca pr i o,  I.  At i yas,  and J.  H anson (1994 eds) Fi nanci al  reform : Theory and 
Exper i ence.   Ne w  Yo r k:   Ca mbr i dge  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
Ca pr i o,  G. ,  and L.  S u mme r s (1994) “Financi al Li berali sati on:  Beyond Lai ssez-Fai r e”, Wo r l d Bank 
Pol i cy  R esearch  Wo r ki ng  Paper s.
Cheung,  Yi n- W ong,  and Lai ,  K on S. ,  (1993) “Fini t e-Sam ple Sizes of Johansen’s L ikel i hood Rat i o 
Tes t s f or  Coi nt egrati on”,   Ox f ord  Bul l eti n  of   Econom i cs  and  St at i sti cs,   Vo l .   55,   pp.   313-328.
De me t r i ades, P. O. ,  M. P.  De v e r eux and K . B.  Lui nt el ( 1998),  “Product i vi t y and Fi nanci al Sector
Pol i cies:  Evi dence f r om  Sout h Eas t   As i a”, Journal   of   Econom i c Behavi or  and  O rgani zati on,   Vo l .   35,  
61-82.
De me t r i ades, P. O.  and K .  H ussein (1996) “ Financi al devel opm ent and Econom i c grow t h:
Coi nt egrati on and Causal i t y Test s for 16 Count r i es”, Journal  of  D evelopm ent  Econom i cs,  Vo l .  51,  
387-411.
De me t r i ades,  P. O.   and  K. B.   Lui nt el  ( 1996),   “Financi al  De v e l opm ent ,   Econom i c Gr ow t h  and  Banki ng 
Sector  Cont r ol s:  Evi dence  Fr om   I ndi a”,The  Econom i c  Journal ,   Vo l .   106,   359
De me t r i ades, P. O.  and K . B.  Lui nt el,  (1997),  “ The D ir ect Cos t s of Fi nanci al Re pr ession:  Evi dence 
Fr om   I ndi a”,  The  Review   of   Econom i cs  and  St at i sti cs,   Vo l .   106,   359-374.16
De me t r i ades, P. O.  and K . B.  Lui nt el (2001),  “Financi al Re s t r aint s in t he Sout h K orean M ir acle”, 
Journal   of   D evelopm ent   Econom i cs,   Vo l .   64,   459-479.
De me t r i ades, P. O.  and M am uneas T. P.  (2000),  “Int ert em poral Ou t put  and Em pl oym ent  Ef f ects of 
Publ i c Infr astr uct ure C apit al:  Evi dence fr om  12 O ECD  Economi es”, Econom i c Journal ,  Vo l .  110,  
687-712.
De mi r güç- K unt ,  A.  and E.  De t r agiache (1998),  "Financi al Li berali sati on and Fi nanci al Fr agil i t y",  
I nt ernat i onal   M onet ary  Fund,   Wo r ki ng  Paper ,   98/ 83.
De wa t r i pont ,  M.  and J.  Ti r ol e (1993), The Prudent i al  Regul at i on of  Banks.  Ca mbr i dge,
M assachusett s:  The  MI T   Press.
Er i csson N .  R.  ( 1995),  “Condi t i onal  and St r uct ural Er r or Cor r ecti on M odel s”, Journal  of
Econom et rics,   Vo l .   69,   159-171.
Fr y,   M. J.  ( 1995),M oney,   I nt erest  and  Banki ng  i n  Econom i c D evelopm ent ,   2nd  edit i on.   London:   John 
H opki ns  Un i versi t y  Pr ess.
Fr y,   M. J.  ( 1998),   “Pit f all s and  Pot enti al  of  Fi nanci al  Li berali sati on”,   Ekonom i a,   Vo l .   2,   1-28.
Ge l b,  A.  ( 1989),  “Financi al Pol i cies and G row t h”, Pol i cy Research W orking Paper,  No . 2,
Wa s h i ngt on  D. C. :   Wo r l d  Bank.
G ennot t e, G. ,  and D .  Pyl e (1991) “C apit al Cont r ol s and Bank Ri sk”, Journal  of  Banki ng and 
Fi nance,   Vo l . 15,   805-824.
Ge r t l er,   M.   and  A.   Ros e   ( 1996),   “Finance,   Publ i c  Pol i cy  and  Gr ow t h”,   i n  J. G.   Ca pr i o,   I .   At i yas  and  J.A.  
H anson  ( eds.) ,   Fi nanci al   Ref orm :  Theory  and  Exper i ence,  Ca mbr i dge:   Ca mbr i dge  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
He l l ma n ,   T. ,   Mu r dock,   K.   and  St i gl i t z,  J.E.   ( 1994a),   "D eposi t   M obi l i zati on  under  Fi nanci al  Re s t r aint ", 
paper presented at the w or kshop on Fi nanci al  D evelopm ent  and Econom i c G row th,  Un i versit y of 
Gr oni ngen,   7-9  D ecem ber  ( 1994).
He l l ma n ,  T. ,  Mu r dock,  K.  and St i gl i t z, J.E.  (1994b),  "A ddressing M oral H azard i n Banki ng:  D eposi t  
Ra t e  Cont r ol s versus Ca pi t al  Requi r em ents",  mi me o ,   St anford  Un i versit y.
He l l ma n ,   T. ,   Mu r dock,   K.   and St i gl i t z,  J.E.   ( 1996a),   "Financi al  Re s t r aint :   Towar d a Ne w  Par adigm ",   i n 
M.  A oki ,  M.  O kuno- Fuj i wa r a and H . Ki m ( eds.) ,  The Rol e of G overnm ent in East  As i an Econom i c 
D evelopm ent :   Com parat i ve  I nst i t ut i onal   Anal ysis,  Ox f ord:   Ox f ord  Un i versit y  Pr ess.
He l l ma n ,  T. ,  Mu r dock,  K.  and St i gl i t z, J.E.  ( 1996b),  "D eposi t  M obi l i sati on Through Fi nanci al
r estr aint ",  i n N.   He r me s   and R.   Lens i nk ( eds.) ,  Fi nanci al   D evelopm ent   and  Econom i c Gr o wt h,   London:  
Rout l edge.
He l l ma n ,   T. F. ,   Mu r dock,   K. C.   and St i gl i t z,  J.E.   ( 2000),   “Liberali sati on,   Mo r al  H azard i n Banki ng,   and 
Pr udent i al  Regul ati on:   Ar e  Ca pi t al  Requi r em ents Enough?”,   Amer i can  Econom i c  Review ,   90,   147-165.
H endry,  D. F.  (1993) “The R oles of Econom i c Theory and Econom et r i cs i n Ti me   Ser i es Econom i cs, 
I nvi t ed  P aperP resented  i n  at   t he  1993  European  m eeti ng  of   Econom et ric  Soci ety,  U ppsal ,   Sw eden.
H endry,     D. F.   and J.  A.   D oorni nk.   ( 1994)  “ M odel i ng Li near  D ynam i c Econom et r i c Syst em s ”,  Scot t i sh
Journal   of   Pol i t i cal  Econom y  ”,  Vo l .   41,   1- 33.
Johansen,   S.   ( 1988)  “Stati sti cal  An a l ysi s of  Coi nt egrati ng  V ectors”, Journal   of   Econom i c D ynam i c and 
Cont rol,   Vo l .   12,   231-254.17
Johansen,  S.  (1995) “Likel i hood – Based Inference In Coi nt egrated V ector Au t oregressive M odel s”, 
Ox f ord  Un i versit y  Pr ess. 
K eeley, M. C. ,  and F. T.  Fur l ong (1990) “ A  R eexam inat i on of M ean-V ari ance A nalysi s of Bank 
Ca pi t al  Regul ati on”,   Journal   of   Banki ng  and  Fi nance,   Vo l . 14,   69-84.
Ki m,  D. ,  and A . M.  Sant om ero (1988) “R isk in Banki ng and Capi t al Regul ati on”,  The Journal   of  
Fi nance,   Vo l . XLI I I ,   1219-1233
La  Por t a,  R. ,   Lopez-D e-Si l anes,  F.   and  Vi shny,   R. W.   ( 1997),   "Legal  De t ermi nant s of  Ext ernal  
Fi nance",   Journal   of  Fi nance,   Vo l .   52,   No .   3,   Paper s and  Pr oceedings,   pp.   1131-1150.
Lynde,   C.   and  J.  Ri chm ond  ( 1993),   “Publ i c C apit al  and Long-Run  Cos t s i n  UK  M anufacturi ng”,  The
Econom i c  Journal ,   Vo l .   103,   880-893.
Mc Ki nnon,   R. I .   ( 1973),  M oney and  Capi t al   i n  Econom i c D evelopm ent .   Wa s h i ngt on D. C. :   Br ooki ng 
Insti t ut i ons.
Mc Ki nnon,  R.  and H .  Pi l l ,  ( 1997) “C redibl e Econom i c Liberal i sati on and O verborr ow i ng”,
Amer i can  Econom i c  Review ,   Vo l .   87,   189-193.
Na d i r i ,   M. I .   and T. P.   M am uneas ( 1994),   “The Ef f ects of  Publ i c I nfr astr uct ure and R&D  Ca pi t al  on 
t he  Cos t   St r uct ure and  Per f orm ance of  US  M anufacturi ng  I ndust r i es”, The Review  of   Econom i cs and 
St at i sti cs,  Vo l .   76,   22-37.
R ossi,  M.  (1999),  “Financi al Fr agil i t y and Econom i c Perf orm ance in D evel opi ng Econom i es - Do  
Ca pi t al Cont r ol s, Pr udent i al Regul ati on and Supervi sion M at t er?”, IMF  Wo r k i ng Paper,W P/ 99/ 66,
Wa s h i ngt on:   I nt ernat i onal   Mo n e t ary  Fund.
Schi antarell i ,  F. ,  I.  At i yas,  G.  Ca pr i o,  J. Ha r r i s, and A .  We i ss (1994),  “ C redit  Wh e r e It  Is  Du e ?  A 
Re vi ew   of  t he  M acro  and  Mi cro  Evi dence  on  t he  R eal  Ef f ects of  Fi nanci al  Re f orm” ,   i n  G.   Ca pr i o,   I .  
At i yas,  and J.  H anson (eds.) ,  Fi nanci al  Ref orm : Theory and Experi ence.  Ne w Yo r k:  Ca mbr i dge 
Un i versi t y  Press.
Shaw,  E. S.  (1973),  Fi nanci al  D eepening i n Econom i c D evelopm ent .  Ne w Yo r k:  Ox f ord U ni versit y 
Pr ess.
Spanos,  A.  (1989),  “ O n R ereading H aavelmo :  A Re t r ospect i ve V i ew  of Econom et r i c M odel l i ng”,
Econom et ric  Theoy,   Vo l .   5,   405-429.
Spanos,  A.  ( 1990),  “ The Simu l t aneous Equat i ons M odel  Re vi sed: St ati sti cal A dequacy and
I dent i f i cati on  ”,  Journal   of   Econom et rics,   Vo l .   44,   87-105.
St i gl i t z,  J.E.   ( 1994)  "T he Rol e of  t he St ate i n Fi nanci al  Ma r ket s",Proceedings of   t he Wo r l d 
Bank  Annual   Conf erence on  D evelopm ent   Econom i cs 1993,   19-52.
St i gl i t z, J.E.  (1998),   Knowl edge For D evelopm ent :  Econom i c Science, Econom i c Poli cy, and 
Econom i c Advise, A ddress to t he W orl d Bank’s 10’t h A nnual  Bank Conference on D evelopm ent  
Econom i cs.
Tayl or,   L.   ( 1983),  St ructural i st  M acroeconom i cs:  Appl i cabl e M odel s of   t he  Thi rd Wo r l d,   Ne w  Yo r k:  
Ba s i c Books.
Va n   Wi j nebergen,   S.   ( 1983),   “Int erest  Ra t e M anagem ent   i n  LDCs ”,   Journal   of  M onet ary  Econom i cs, 
Vo l .   12,   433-452.
Wo r l d Bank (1993),  The East  As i an M i racle: Econom i c G row th and Publ i c Poli cy.  Ne w Yo r k:  
O xford Un i versi t y  Press.18
Tabl e 1  –  A  S u mma r y   of  Fi nanci al   Pol i cies
Interest  Ra t e Co nt rols R eserve   Requi rem entsL i qui di t y  Requi rem ents
Gr eece In  1987,   i nt erest  r ate on 
vari ous  deposi t s and  on  mo s t  
categori es  of  short   and  l ong 
t erm  l oans  we r e deregul ated. 
I n  1989,   t he  sett i ng  of  saving 
deposi t   r ates we r e l i berali zed, 
but   t hey  we r e sti l l   subj ect  t o 
mi ni mu m  r ate establi shed by 
t he  Bank  of  Gr eece wh i ch wa s  
abol i shed i n  1993.  
Re qui r ed r eserve  r ati os  we r e 
qui t e hi gh  unt i l   t he  earl y  90s.  
I n  1970s  and  1980s,   banks 
we r e r equi r ed t o  i nvest   a 
cert ain  f r acti on  of  t hei r   t ot al 
deposi t s i n  short-t erm
governm ent   bonds.   These 
r equi r em ents we r e r educed i n 
1990-1993  and  abol i shed i n 
1993.
Thai l and C eil i ngs  on  l endi ng  r ates 
l i berali zed i n  1992.   I nt erest 
r ate on  deposi t s com pletely 
l i berali zed i n  1990
Re s e r ve  r equi r em ents we r e set 
l ow .   Va r i ati on  i n  t he  r eserve 
r equi r em ent  we r e also l ow
I n  1991,   t he  Bank  of  Thai l and 
r elaxed t he  const r aint   on 
c o mme r cial  banks'   port f ol i o 
m anagem ent   by  r eplacing  t he 
r eserve  r equi r em ent  r ati o  wi t h 
t he  l i qui di t y  r ati o
Phi l i ppi nes In  1980,   ceil i ngs  on  deposi t  
r ates f or  deposi t s wi t h 
ma t uri t y  >2    years we r e 
r em oved  and  short er 
ma t uri t i es we r e subj ect  t o 
ceil i ngs  of  14% .   I n  1981,  
r em aini ng  ceil i ngs  on  deposi t  
r ates we r e abol i shed and  l oan 
r ate ceil i ngs  we r e r aised.  I n 
1983,   r em aini ng  ceil i ngs  on 
short-t erm  l oan  r ates we r e 
r em oved.
Re s e r ve  r equi r em ents 
i ncreased signi f i cantl y  i n  t he 
mi d  80s  and  again  i n  t he  earl y 
90s.
No   f orma l   l i qui di t y  r ati os  i n 
pl ace.
Ko r ea C eil i ngs  on  l endi ng  r ates 
abol i shed i n  1979.   Ce i l i ngs  on 
deposi t   r ates l i berali zed i n 
1988
Reduct i ons  i n  r eserve 
r equi r em ents i n  t he  mi d  90s.  
No   f orma l   l i qui di t y  r ati os  i n 
pl ace.
I ndi aC e i l i ngs  on  l endi ng  r ate 
i m posed  i n  1963-1968  and 
t hen  r e-i m posed  i n  1975-1987.
Ce i l i ngs  on  deposi t   r ate 
i m posed  since 1969
Re s e r ve  r equi r em ents 
i ncreased consi derably  i n  t he 
mi d  80s  and  cont i nued  t o  be 
hi gh  i n  t he  90s.
Li qui di t y  r ati os  i ncreased 
signi f i cantl y  i n  t he  80s  and  by 
t he  90s  r ati os  we r e as hi gh  as 
38. 5%
Egypt Cei l i ngs  on  l endi ng  and 
deposi t   r ates abol i shed i n 
1990.   Ce i l i ngs  on  l ending  and 
deposi t   r ates i m posed    1978-
1990.
Re s e r ve  r equi r em ents 
i ncreased signi f i cantl y  i n  1978 
and  r em ained  hi gh  up  t o  1990.  
Li qui di t y  r ati os  wa s   as hi gh  as 
30%   i n  1960-1990  and 
decreased signi f i cantl y 
aft erwa r ds.
SOURCES:  A nnual  report s of centr al banks;  IM F A nnual  Report  on Exchange Rest r i cti ons (vari ous i ssues);  
Ca pr i o,   At i yas,   and  H enson  ( 1994  eds),  Fi nanci al   Ref orm ;  Cheng,   H. ,   ( 1986),  Fi nanci al   Pol i cy Ref orm   i n  Paci f i c 
Bas i n  Count ries;    Wi l l i am son,   J.,   and  M.   Ma h a r   ( 1998),   A  Survey of   Fi nanci al   Li beral i sati on;   Li m,   J.  Y.   ( 1991),  
The  Phi l i ppi ne  Fi nanci al   sector  i n  t he  1980s;     Bank  of  Thai l and  ( 1994),  Thai l and’s Fi nanci al   Syst em :  St ructure 
and Li beral i sati on;   Johnst on,  B. ,  S.  Do r bar,  and C.  Echeverr i a (1997), Sequenci ng Capi t al  Account
Li beral i sati on:  Lessons  f rom  t he  Exper i ences i n  Chi l e,  I ndonesi a,   Kor e a,   and  Thai l and;   De me t r i ades,  P. O.   and  B.  
Fat t ouh (2001),  “U nproduct i ve Credi t  and t he Sout h K orean C ri sis”,Ce Fi MS ,  SO AS,  Di scussion Paper No.  10;
De me t r i ades,  P,   and  K. B.   Lui nt el  ( 1997,   2001).19
Tabl e 2:  C orrelati on  Ma t rix  of  pol i cy vari abl es
Tabl e 2. 1:  C orrelati on  ma t rix  of  Ko r e a   pol i cy vari abl es
DRC LRC RR I RR
DRC 1. 0000
LRC 0. 8790 1. 0000
RR 0. 5095 0. 1782 1. 0000
I RR 0. 9678 0. 9707 0. 3508 1. 0000
Tabl e 2. 2:  C orrelati on  ma t rix  of  Phi l i ppi nes  pol i cy vari abl es
LRC DRC RRDD RRTD I RR
LRC 1. 0000
DRC 0. 8859 1. 0000
RRDD 0. 0410 0. 00658 1. 0000
RRTD - 0. 4116 - 0. 3257 0. 2045 1. 0000
I RR 0. 9709 0. 9712 0. 02448 -0. 3795 1. 0000
Tabl e 2. 3:  C orrelati on  ma t rix  of  pol i cy vari abl es i n  Thai l and
LRC DRC RR I RR
LRC 1. 0000
DRC 0. 8224 1. 0000
RR - 0. 6092 - 0. 5868 1. 0000
I RR 0. 9491 0. 9597 - 0. 6257 1. 0000
Tabl e 2. 4:  C orrelati on  ma t rix  of  pol i cy vari abl es i n  G reece
LRC DRC RR I RR
LRC 1. 0000
DRC 0. 9790 1. 0000
RR 0. 5300 0. 6543 1. 0000
I RR 0. 9954 0. 9940 0. 5911 1. 000020
Tabl e 2. 5:  C orrelati on  ma t rix  of  pol i cy vari abl es i n  Indi a
LRC DRC LQR RR I RR PCRLR
LRC 1. 0000
DRC 0 . 0118 1. 0000
LQR 0. 1492 - 0. 2872 1. 0000
RR 0. 0048 - 0. 3466 0. 8357 1. 0000
I RR 0. 9387 0. 3558 0. 0404 - 0. 1149 1. 0000
PCRLR - 0. 03553 - 0. 4507 0. 9372 0. 8734 0. 8966 1. 0000
Tabl e 2. 6:  C orrelati on  Ma t rix  of  pol i cy vari abl es i n  Egypt
LQR DRC LRC RR I RR PCRLR
LQR 1. 0000
DRC 0. 3629 1. 0000
LRC 1. 000 0. 3629 1. 0000
RR 0. 2849 0. 9117 0. 2849 1. 0000
I RR 0. 7813 0. 8651 0. 7813 0. 7640 1. 0000
PCRLR 0. 8015 0. 7951 0. 8015 0. 8015 0. 9640 1. 0000
VARI ABLE DEFI NI TI ON:  DRC s t ands for D eposi t  Ra t e Cont r ol s; LRC i s Lendi ng Rat e Cont r ol s; RR i s 
Re s e r ve Requi r em ents;  I RR  i s I nt erest  Ra t e Re s t r aint s;  RRDD  i s Re s e r ve Requi r em ents on D em and D eposi t s; 
RRTD i s R eserve Requi r em ents on Ti m e D eposi t s; LQR i s L iqui di t y Reserve Requi r em ents; PCRLR i s 
Pr i nci pal   Com ponent   of  Re s e r ve  and  Li qui di t y  Requi r em ents. 21
Tabl e 3A .   No r ma l i sed Co i nt egrati ng  V ectors
Count ry                                   Va r i abl es
K orea:                                          LFD                                          LGDPK                          Trend                                  RI RD
1. 0000  ** -0. 5779  ** -0. 0137  **                    0. 0096
Phi l i ppi nes                            LFD                                          LGDPK                            Trend                                  RI RD                            IR R
1. 0000  *- 0 . 6338 -0. 006  ** -0. 0134**                1. 032  **
Thai l and                                    LFD                                        LGDPK                            T rend
1. 0000  *- 1 . 041  ** -0. 0103
G reece                                         LFD                                          LGDPK                                                                                  RI RD
1. 0000  *- 0 . 3602  *- 0 . 0244  **
Indi a                                                LFD                 LGDPK                                                                                  RI RD                                                            PCRLR
1. 0000  *-   0. 0503  ** -  0. 0011  ** -   0. 0599**
Egypt                                              LFD                                          LGDPK                                                                                  RI RD                            I RR                    PCRLR
                  1. 0000  ** -1. 264  ** -0. 0030 -0. 3683            0. 1118*
NOTES:   **  I ndi cates  signi f i cance  at  t he  1  percent  l evel;   *  I ndi cates  signi f i cance  at  t he  5  percent  l evel.  
Tabl e 3B.   Di agnosti c Te s t   f or  t he  U nrestricted VAR  Es t i ma t i on
Te s t s K orea Phil i ppi nes Thai l and G reece India Egypt
GDP AUT 1. 546 [ 0. 239] 1. 737 [ 0. 198] 4. 016 [ 0. 041] 0. 290 [ 0. 751] 0. 578 [ 0. 570] 1. 309 [ 0. 292]
LFDAUT 1. 083 [ 0. 302] 0. 205 [ 0. 815] 3. 215 [ 0. 070] 1. 908 [ 0. 178] 0. 668 [ 0. 524] 1. 646 [ 0. 217]
GDP ARCH 0. 089 [ 0. 770] 0. 658 [ 0. 425] 0. 115 [ 0. 738] 0. 454 [ 0. 509] 2. 151 [ 0. 158] 0. 020 [ 0. 886]
LFDARCH 0. 005 [ 0. 940] 0. 0005  [ 0. 98] 0. 697 [ 0. 417] 9. 109 [ 0. 007] 0. 178 [ 0. 677] 2. 865 [ 0. 106]
GDP NORM 1. 082 [ 0. 582] 1. 985 [ 0. 370] 1. 592 [ 0. 451] 1. 200 [ 0. 548] 0. 808 [ 0667] 0. 381 [ 0. 826]
LFDNORM 0. 184 [ 0. 911] 2. 375 [ 0. 304] 3. 888 [ 0. 143] 1. 352 [ 0. 508] 1. 579 [ 0. 453] 0. 005 [ 0. 997]
GDP HET -0 . 363 [ 0. 955] - 0. 359 [ 0. 931] 0. 461 [ 0. 890] 0. 048 [ 0. 999]
LFDHET -0 . 217 [ 0. 994] - 0. 952 [ 0. 583] 0. 503 [ 0. 864] 0. 071 [ 0. 998]
VAR AUT 1. 483 [ 0. 248] 0. 658 [ 0. 724] 1. 994 [ 0. 095] 0. 895 [ 0. 533] 2. 309 [ 0. 073] 1. 983 [ 0. 079]
VAR NORM 0. 963 [ 0. 915] 3. 759 [ 0. 439] 10. 21 [ 0. 038] 4. 459 [ 0. 347] 1. 272 [ 0. 866] 1. 516 [ 0. 823]
VAR HET -0 . 192 [ 1. 000] - 0. 291 [ 0. 992] 0. 309 [ 0. 997] 59. 08 [ 0. 509]
No t es: (1) The f ol l ow i ng t ests are for for the equat i ons of GDP a n d  Fi nanci al De v e l opm ent :  GDP AUT  and 
LFDAUT  denot e t he  autocorr elati on  t ests;  GDP ARCH  and LFDARCH  denot e t he t ests f or  ARCH  eff ects;  LFDNORM
and LFD NORM denot e norma l i t y t ests; GDP HET and LFD HET denot e tests for het eroscedasti sit y;  VARAUT,
VAR NORM and V A RHET denot e tests for autocorr elati on,  norma l i t y and het eroscadasti cit y respecti vel y i n t he 
unrestr i cted VAR  m odel .   ( 2)  The  num bers i n  t he  square brackets show   t he  p  val ues  of  t he  nul l   hypot heses t hat  
r esidual s are uncorr elated, hom oscedast i c and norma l l y di str i but ed. (3) W e have used t he relevant F and χ
2
t ests bot h  f or  t he  i ndi vi dual   equat i ons  and  f or  t he  VAR.  22
Tabl e 4:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM
Tabl e 4. 1:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or  K orea
DLFD DLGDPK DLGDPK( 1) DLGDPK( 2) D L F D (1) D L F D (2) C I(1) IRR RR
Coe f f i cient


























Tabl e 4. 2:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or  Phi l i ppi nes
DLFD DLGDPK DLGDPK( 1 ) DLGDPK( 2) D L F D (1) C I(1)
Coe f f i cient
St d.   E rror
t - prob
0. 3450









  0. 1492
0. 0031
- 0. 0465
    0. 0208
0. 0338
Tabl e 4. 3.   Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or  Thai l and
DLFD D L F D (1) C I(1) D LG D P K R R
Coe f f i cient














Tabl e 4. 4:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or G reece
DLFD DLGDPK DLGDPK( 1) GLFD( 1) DLFD( 2) CI ( 1) I RR( 1)
Coe f f i cient




















Tabl e 4. 5:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or  Indi a
DLFD DLGDPK( 1) DLFD( 1) CI ( 1) I RR( 1)
Coe f f i cient














Tabl e 4. 6:  Pars i mo n i ous  Condi t i onal   ECM   f or  Egypt
DLFD DLGDPK DLGDPK( 1 ) DLGDPK( 2 ) DLFD( 1 ) DLFD( 2 ) CI ( 1 )
Coe f f i cient
St d.   E rror
t - prob
- 0. 5095
0. 1594
0. 0034
0. 7060
0. 2255
0. 0041
- 0. 7555
0. 2319
0. 0029
0. 8187
0. 1466
0. 0000
- 0. 3457
0. 1421
0. 0214
- 0. 3078
0. 0829
0. 0009